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Brexit	is	a	blank	sheet	of	paper	that	can	never	be
filled	in
The	frenzied	negotiations	to	conclude	the	first	phase	of	Brexit	negotiations	have	usefully	clarified	the
real	choices	faced	by	the	British	government	in	the	second	phase.	The	ambiguous	and	variously
defined	terms	“soft”	and	“hard”	Brexit	have	outlived	their	usefulness.	As	it	turns	out,	Brexit	is	a	blank
sheet	of	paper	that	can	never	be	filled	in,	writes	Brendan	Donnelly	(Federal	Trust).
It	is	clear	that	the	British	government	must	now	decide	whether	it	wishes	after	Brexit	to	remain	close
to	the	standards	and	regulations	of	the	European	Union,	thereby	limiting	the	economic	damage	and
disruption	from	a	radical	break	with	the	Union.	Or	whether,	on	the	contrary,	it	wishes	for	political
reasons	to	facilitate	this	radical	break,	even	to	the	extent	of	leaving	the	Union	with	no	agreed	template	for	future
economic	relations	between	the	two	sides.	The	vigorous	debate	at	the	beginning	of	December	about	a	possible
“hard”	or	“soft”	border	within	the	island	of	Ireland	arose	largely	from	the	fact	that	the	British	government	has	not	yet
decided	which	of	these	two	options	it	favours.	The	confused	nature	of	the	text	relating	to	Ireland	finally	adopted	by
the	EU	and	UK	reflects	this	continuing	uncertainty.
The	Conservative	government	is	now	coming	to	realize	that	if	it	wishes	to	bring
about	any	kind	of	Brexit	it	will	be	forced	to	make	painful	choices
Those	who	voted	for	Brexit	in	June	2016	were	always	divided	between	those	wanting	a	radical	break	with	the	EU
and	those	wanting	to	maintain	the	status	quo	as	far	as	possible.	This	division	was	to	some	extent	concealed	by	the
reassuring	but	unrealistic	argument	of	the	“leave”	campaigners	that	if	it	left	the	EU,	the	United	Kingdom	would	be
able	to	dictate	whatever	terms	for	it	wished	for	its	future	relationship	with	the	Union.	This	disingenuous	argument	not
merely	tapped	into	British	delusions	of	grandeur,	it	was	also	an	important	instrument	for	keeping	together	the
disparate	wings	of	the	“leave”	campaign.	The	Conservative	government	is	now	coming	to	realise	that	if	it	wishes	to
bring	about	any	kind	of	Brexit	it	will	be	forced	to	make	painful	choices.	The	EU	has	made	plain	that	it	sees	these
painful	choices	as	a	necessity	the	UK	has	inflicted	upon	itself.	Any	help	the	UK	can	expect	from	its	former	partners	in
lessening	the	pain	will,	therefore,	be	limited.	The	Union	itself	has	important	interests	to	defend	in	the	Brexit
negotiations,	some	of	which	run	counter	to	short-term	British	interests.	The	Union	can	and	will	defend	those	against
an	obviously	weaker	negotiating	partner.
A	peculiar	difficulty	for	the	divided	Conservative	Party	is	posed	by	the	fact	that	both	its	contrasting	wings	have
apparently	unanswerable	objections	to	each	other’s	position.	Those	favouring	a	less	radical	breakpoint	to	the	near-
unanimous	agreement	of	business,	the	City	and	economic	analysts	that	an	abrupt	and	wide-ranging	disengagement
from	the	Union	will	increase	substantially	the	economic	damage	wrought	by	Brexit.	It	was	pressure	from	such
sources,	many	of	them	traditionally	Conservative-leaning,	that	led	to	Theresa	May’s	capitulation	to	the	EU’s	terms	for
concluding	the	first	phase	of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	The	radicals	in	her	party	point	on	the	other	hand	to	the	political
incoherence	of	a	decision	to	leave	the	EU	and	yet	to	continue	to	be	substantially	bound	by	its	regulatory	decisions,
decisions	the	UK	will	have	had	little	opportunity	to	influence.	The	vote	to	leave	the	EU,	argue	the	radicals,	was	one	to
“take	back	control”	and	this	vote	demands	the	greatest	possible	level	of	emancipation	from	EU	intrusiveness.		Within
the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party,	opinion	tilts	towards	those	favouring	a	less	abrupt	and	dislocating	Brexit.
Within	the	Conservative	Party	as	a	whole,	there	is	a	clear	majority	for	a	more	radical	and	disruptive	approach.
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Canada	plus	or	Norway	light
Almost	certainly,	the	British	government	will	attempt	in	the	first	stages	of	the	second	phase	Brexit	negotiations	to	put
forward	some	kind	of	a	“bespoke”	arrangement	for	future	economic	relations	between	the	UK	and	EU	–	it	is	this
prospect	which	May	has	used	to	try	and	maintain	unity	in	her	fractious	party.	David	Davis	seems	to	have	had
something	similar	in	mind	in	his	reference	to	“Canada	plus	plus	plus,”	or	a	trade	arrangement	more	favourable	to	the
UK	than	that	enjoyed	by	Canada,	but	with	little	or	nothing	in	the	way	of	extra	obligations	on	the	UK	compared	with
Canada’s.				It	can	confidently	be	predicted	that	this	proposal	will	make	little	headway.	When	Michel	Barnier	speaks
so	dismissively	of	British	attempts	to	“cherry	pick”	in	the	Brexit	negotiations,	he	is	faithfully	reflecting	the	views	of	the
European	Council	and	of	France	and	Germany	in	particular.	For	the	Council,	it	is	now	up	to	the	UK	to	opt	either	for
the	arm’s	length	trading	relationship	implicit	in	the	model	of	its	arrangement	with	Canada,	or	to	seek	a	more	intimate
economic	relationship,	comparable	to	that	between	the	EU	and	Norway,	a	status	which	can	only	be	accorded	on	the
basis	of	acceptance	by	the	UK	of	corresponding	obligations.	The	European	Council	called	indeed	in	this	month’s
conclusions	for	the	UK	now	to	clarify	its	choice	between	these	options	in	a	way	that	it	has	failed	to	do	until	now.
If	and	when	this	clarification	occurs,	it	will	have	interesting	implications	for	the	Brexit	process	more	generally,
particularly	in	the	House	of	Commons.	The	Labour	Party	has	made	increasingly	clear	in	recent	months	that	it	will	not
accept	a	radical,	disruptive	Brexit.	The	logic	of	this	position,	even	if	Labour	has	been	reluctant	to	articulate	this
publicly,	is	that	the	UK	should	remain	in	the	EU	Customs	Union	and	in	the	single	market.	May	on	the	other	hand	is
committed	to	taking	the	UK	out	of	both,	hoping	forlornly	that	it	will	be	possible	to	agree	equivalent	arrangements	after
Brexit	for	“frictionless”	trade	with	the	EU.	The	likely	unwillingness	of	the	EU	to	concede	any	such	“bespoke”
agreement	will	set	the	scene	for	domestic	UK	political	confrontation	in	the	summer	or	autumn	of	next	year.		The
Conservative	Party	can	corporately	never	accept	anything	comparable	to	the	status	of	Norway	vis-à-vis	the	EU.
There	can	never	be,	however,	a	majority	in	the	Commons	for	taking	Canada	as	a	model	of	the	UK’s	economic
relationship	with	the	EU.	David	Davis	is	seeking	to	disguise	this	latter	reality	with	his	fanciful	talk	of	“Canada	plus
plus	plus,”	a	bespoke	arrangement	by	any	other	name.
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Commentators	have	rightly	been	cautious	in	assigning	significance	to	the	rebellion	of	11	Conservative	MPs’	seeking
to	achieve	a	“meaningful”	vote	on	Brexit	for	the	Commons	next	year.	The	rebellion	itself	was	narrowly	focussed	and
its	authors	disavowed	any	general	attempt	to	undermine	the	government’s	Brexit	policy.	It	is,	however,	worth
recalling	that	the	Eurosceptic	revolts	of	the	1990s	were	equally	limited	in	their	beginnings	and	were	carried	out	by
MPs	claiming	to	support	the	general	European	policy	of	the	Conservative	government.	The	rebellion	does	suggest
that	there	are	those	within	the	Conservative	Parliamentary	Party	willing	to	take	a	stand	against	the	hitherto
unchallenged	radical	Eurosceptic	drift	of	governmental	policy	on	Brexit.	If,	as	seems	likely,	May	fails	to	negotiate	a
“bespoke”	Brexit	agreement	and	is	forced	to	return	to	MPs	with	an	arrangement	very	similar	to	that	negotiated	by
Canada,	there	is	a	good	chance	that	there	will	be	Conservative	MPs	prepared	to	contest	that	outcome	and	join	with
the	Labour	Party	in	doing	so.	It	would	not	take	many	MPs	to	join	this	contestation	for	May’s	majority	to	disappear.
No	agreed	template	for	Brexit
When	New	Labour	attempted	to	reform	the	House	of	Lords,	one	of	the	major	procedural	difficulties	it	faced	was	the
inability	of	reformers	to	agree	on	the	nature	of	the	new	second	chamber	they	sought,	an	inability	gleefully	exploited
by	those	hostile	to	any	reform.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	something	similar	may	be	the	fate	of	Brexit,	with	no
individual	model	for	the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	Union	being	able	to	command	a	majority	of	MPs.		The	former
diplomatic	adviser	to	Margaret	Thatcher,	Lord	Powell,	was	recently	quoted	as	saying	that	the	divisions	in	the
Conservative	Party	over	Europe	were	so	deep	that	the	party	was	“more	or	less	bound	to	split	at	some	point.”	The
choice	between	the	Canadian	model	and	the	Norwegian	model	after	Brexit	may	well	occasion	this	split.		If	so,	all
previous	calculations	about	the	inevitability	of	Brexit	will	need	to	be	reassessed.	The	unity	of	the	Conservative	Party
has	been	a	powerful	instrument	in	the	hands	of	the	Eurosceptic	minority	of	Conservative	MPs	as	they	sought	over
the	past	twenty	years	to	bend	the	party,	usually	successfully,	to	their	radical	and	populist	agenda.	The	loss	of	that
unity	of	itself	would	render	the	realisation	of	Brexit	considerably	more	difficult	to	bring	about	successfully.
It	is	a	favoured	argument	of	many	on	the	radical	Eurosceptic	wing	of	the	Conservative	Party	that	if	the	Commons
attempts	to	reject	the	agreement	reached	by	May	in	the	autumn	of	next	year,	that	rejection	will	be	null	and	void	and
the	UK	will	anyway	leave	the	EU	in	March	2019	in	accordance	with	the	terms	of	Article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty.	This
argument	would	be	correct	only	if	MPs,	having	rejected	May’s	proposed	text,	were	content	simply	to	remain	inactive
and	impotent	until	March	2019.	There	is	no	reason	to	assume	that	such	would	be	the	case	if	the	Commons	had	once
steeled	itself	to	take	the	far-reaching	step	of	disavowing	the	results	of	May’s	negotiations.	A	number	of	options	would
be	open	to	the	Commons	in	those	circumstances,	not	least	that	of	a	new	referendum	for	the	voters	to	choose
between	accepting	the	result	of	the	government’s	Brexit	negotiations	or	remaining	in	the	EU.	Public	opinion	has
recently	been	shifting	significantly	in	favour	of	such	a	second	referendum,	influenced	no	doubt	by	the	realisation	of
the	lies	and	wishful	thinking	that	underpinned	so	much	of	the	“leave”	campaign.
In	2002,	Davis	remarked	that	referendums	should	only	be	held	if	voters	were	told	“exactly	what	they	were	voting	for.”
In	particular,	the	electorate	should	not	be	asked	to	vote	on	a	“blank	sheet	of	paper.”	The	2016	EU	referendum	could
not	by	any	stretch	of	the	imagination	be	held	to	meet	this	threshold.	It	would	be	a	delicious	irony	if	Davis	had	the
opportunity	forced	upon	him	in	late	2018	to	prove	his	intellectual	consistency	by	accepting	the	need	for	another
European	referendum,	with	its	consequences	more	exactly	specified	than	was	possible	in	2017.	The	arguments	in
favour	of	such	a	referendum	would	not	require	from	the	Brexit	Secretary	much	intelligence	or	factual	knowledge	to	be
understood.	They	would	therefore	fall	squarely	within	his	self-proclaimed	capacities.	The	referendum	itself	may	on
the	other	hand	test	the	calmness	to	which	he	has	recently	laid	claim.	It	will	not	be	as	easy	to	sell	the	electorate	a
distinctly	mangy	Brexit	pup	the	second	time	around	as	it	was	the	first	time.
An	earlier	version	of	this	post	appeared	on	The	Federal	Trust	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those
of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Brendan	Donnelly	has	been	Director	of	the	Federal	Trust	since	January	2003	and	is	a	Senior	Research	Fellow	at	the
Global	Policy	Institute.	He	is	a	former	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	(1994	to	1999).
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